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A SIGN OF THE TIMES: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT EFFECTIVELY ABOLISHES
THE NARROWLY TAILORED REQUIREMENT
FOR TIME, PLACE AND MANNER
RESTRICTIONS
Carney R. Shegerian*
I. INTRODUCTION
Accentuating how freedom of speech is deeply embedded in the his-
torical tradition of the United States, Justice Benjamin Cardozo charac-
terized this right anchored in the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution as "the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom." 1 Since 17912 when the First Amendment was affixed to the
Constitution,3 and continuing through the last two hundred years, this
* B.B.A., 1986, Hofstra University; J.D., 1990, Loyola Law School. Mr. Shegerian is an
associate with the law firm Russell Iungerich in Los Angeles, California. The author expresses
his gratitude to and appreciation of three exceptional people, John S. Shegerian, Tammy L.
Shegerian and Lisa F. Kleinman.
1. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Expressed otherwise, Thomas Jefferson propounded that
"the only security of all, is in a free press. The force of public opinion cannot be resisted, when
permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces must be submitted to. It is neces-
sary to keep the waters pure." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Lafayette (Nov. 4, 1823), in 7
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 325 (Washington ed.) (Henry A. Washington ed. 1861).
2. First Amendment concerns were deeply rooted in American society before the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights. As Justice Douglas stated:
The importance of free discussion in all areas was well perceived in this country
before our constitutional scheme was formulated. In a letter sent to the inhabitants
of Quebec in 1774, the Continental Congress spoke of "five great rights," stating in
part: "The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The impor-
tance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 288 n.2
(1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
1774-1789, at 108 (Ford ed. 1904) (emphasis added by Douglas, J.)).
3. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of Grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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pronouncement rings with such a basal truth that this freedom has subse-
quently been demanded by the citizens of all free nations.
4
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the special place
that freedom of speech occupies in the constitutional framework.' Ac-
cordingly, the Court has continuously applied close scrutiny to govern-
mental actions that infringe upon free speech.6 The Court has also
recognized that the First Amendment protects many different media
forms beyond basic oral and written communication.' One medium that
has received constitutional protection is expression through music.'
Recently, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,9 the Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether a city could control the sound
system used by musicians playing in the city's public park without violat-
ing the First Amendment.lO The Court upheld the New York City regu-
lation that required bands to use both the city's own sound system and
sound engineer when playing in Central Park." The city's purpose in
4. See, eg., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 2(b); GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution][GG] tit. I, art. 5 (F.R.G.); COSTITUZIONE
[Constitution][Cost.] pt. I, tit. 1, art. 21 (Italy); MONACO CONST. tit. III, art. 23. As the
Supreme Court stated in one of its earliest cases on First Amendment issues, "freedom of
speech and of the press are elements of liberty all will acclaim. Indeed, they are so intimate to
liberty in every one's convictions-we may say feelings-that there is an instinctive and instant
revolt from any limitation of them." Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920) (nev-
ertheless holding speech at issue not protected by First Amendment).
5. The special place is that freedom of speech is intended to protect novel and unconven-
tional ideas even if they might be disturbing. Freedom of speech is essential to having an
informed public. Therefore, state power to abridge this freedom must be the exception, not the
rule. See, eg., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (reversing, as violation of
freedom of speech, conviction under ordinance forbidding any person from canvassing resi-
dences for purpose of distributing handbills or circulars); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (reversing state conviction under ordinance intended to keep streets clean, where de-
fendant was charged with handing out literature on public street); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937) (reversing, as violation of freedom of speech, conviction under state statute that was
construed to criminalize soliciting members for political party, which arguably advocated ulti-
mately resorting to violence in indefinite future against organized government); Fiske v. Kan-
sas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (reversing, as violation of due process, conviction under state statute
that criminalized advocating crime, physical violence, arson, destruction of property, sabotage,
or other unlawful acts, where defendant was charged with securing members in organization
whose constitution advocated that working class should act to abolish wage system).
6. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
7. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (motion pictures).
8. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music ... is protected
under the First Amendment."); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 569 (9th
Cir. 1984) ("[L]ive musical expression is protected under the First Amendment.").
9. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
10. Id. at 784.
11. Id. at 803.
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enacting the statute was noise level control and assurance of quality
sound. 
12
The critical issue in Ward was whether the regulation was a permis-
sible time, place and manner restriction.13 Justice Kennedy, writing for a
majority of the Court, applied minimal scrutiny to the city's regulation.14
As a result, the Court upheld the regulation, holding that the city's
method of regulating the noise was narrowly tailored to serve the regula-
tion's purposes.15 The majority's analysis adopted language from recent
Supreme Court cases that gave the narrowly tailored requirement little, if
any, force.
16
In contrast, the Supreme Court has traditionally subjected govern-
mental regulations to greater scrutiny when deciding whether such regu-
lations are narrowly tailored to their governmental purposes. 7
However, the phrasing of this higher degree of scrutiny has taken on
differing forms and meanings in separate high court opinions. As a re-
sult, the Court in Ward exacerbated an internal conflict between the
Court's earlier and more recent decisions regarding the standard of scru-
tiny to be applied to time, place and manner restrictions. The older stan-
dard questioned the degree of the legislation's spill-over effect onto
12. See id at 787.
13. Id. at 789.
14. See id at 798-99; see also infra notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
15. Ward, 491 U.S. at 803; see infra notes 77-99 and accompanying text.
16. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99; see United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)
(noting narrowly tailored requirement satisfied "so long as the ... regulation promotes a
substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regula-
tion"); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984) ("[]f the
time, place, or manner restriction ... sufficiently and narrowly serves a substantial enough
governmental interest to escape First Amendment condemnation, it is untenable to invalidate
it.").
17. See infra notes 244-54 and accompanying text. The lower federal courts have also
applied varying degrees of scrutiny for the narrowly tailored requirement. At one extreme, the
Third Circuit has found this requirement satisfied so long as the regulation leaves open "ample
alternative channels of communication." Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 798
(3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983). At the other end of the spectrum,
the Eighth Circuit has required that a time, place or manner regulation be sufficiently narrow
that it uses the least restrictive means available to achieve the government's substantial inter-
est. Association of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818
(8th Cir. 1983); accord New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d
232, 237-39 (2d Cir. 1982).
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untargeted activitiesi" whereas the newer standard appears not to ex-
amine the spill-over effect at all. 9
This Article discusses how the majority and dissenting opinions in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism take conflicting positions on the standard
the narrowly tailored requirement should be allotted in the context of
First Amendment analysis.2" This Article then analyzes the obvious flaw
in the Ward majority's application of the narrowly tailored standard:
21
in applying this newer standard, the Supreme Court has effectively de-
leted the narrowly tailored requirement from the appropriate analysis of
time, place and manner regulations.22 Finally, this Article proposes a
middle-of-the-road approach, an analysis which the Court has histori-
cally applied in First Amendment cases.23
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Rock Against Racism (RAR) is an association that describes itself
as "dedicated to the espousal and promotion of anti-racist views."24 One
of RAR's principal methods for expressing its anti-racist viewpoints is
through rock concerts.2" At these concerts, speakers who represent
groups opposed to racism are given the opportunity to state their views.
26
RAR sponsored annual concerts from 1979 through 1986 at the
Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in New York City.2 7 The Naumberg
Acoustic Bandshell (bandshell) is an open air amphitheater in the south-
east portion of New York City's Central Park.28 According to the dis-
18. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (invalidating ban on any flag, banner or
device used to publicize any party, organization or movement on public sidewalk outside
Supreme Court building as unreasonable place restriction).
19. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
20. See infira notes 74-123 and accompanying text.
21. See infira notes 322-30, 372-79 and accompanying text.
22. See infira notes 322-30 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 332-71 and accompanying text.
24. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
25. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781
(1989).
26. Id.
27. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1989).
28. Id. The bandshell is located approximately ten blocks north of the park's southern
boundary at Fifty-Ninth Street. It faces west, away from the park's peripheral border and
surrounding Central Park West residences. Id. The bandshell consists of a raised stage ex-
tending out from an acoustic shell, which faces a "well-defined paved 'concertground,' which is
in turn surrounded by grassy areas, slight elevations, and trees." Rock Against Racism, 658 F.
Supp. at 1351. A grassy area called the Sheep Meadow lies to the west of the concertground.
[Vol. 25:453
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trict court in Ward, the bandshell was "one of the most popular and
heavily used outdoor entertainment facilities in Central Park."
29
New York City requires a permit for the use of the bandshell.30 Be-
tween 1979 and 1983 the city received complaints about excessive noise
at RAR's concerts from park users and residents living near the park.31
Before RAR's 1984 concert the city told RAR that its event permit
would be revoked if specified volume levels were exceeded.32 When the
sound levels exceeded the specified level at a 1984 concert, two citations
were issued to RAE. and the electric power to the amplifiers was shut
off.3 3 In 1985 when RAR agreed to abide by the city's volume limits, the
city allowed the association to put on its concert.34 This concert was
performed without any noise complaints.
35
In March of 1986 the city's Department of Parks established
mandatory procedures for granting concert permits36 to any sponsor who
applied for permission to hold an event at the bandshell. 37 These guide-
lines set out the city's policy on twelve subjects, including sound amplifi-
cation.38 The city's purpose in establishing the guidelines was to assist
sponsors "in understanding their responsibilities; to prevent overuse,
crowding, security problems and excessive noise; and to avoid conflicts
with other users of Central Park."
'3 9
The sound amplification provisions for the bandshell required that
all event sponsors use "a sound system and sound engineer supplied by
the city, and no other equipment."'  As a result, "the volume, the sound
'mix,' and the overall sound quality" were under the physical control of a
Ward, 491 U.S. at 784. This grassy area is a city-designated quiet area for passive recreations
such as reclining, walking and reading. IH£
29. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1351.
30. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 368.
31. Ward, 491 U.S. at 785.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 636 F. Supp. 178, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
36. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 368 n.1 (quoting CITY OF NEW YORK PARKS &
RECREATION, USE GUIDELINES FOR THE NAUMBERG BANDSHELL IN CENTRAL PARK
(1986)), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
37. Id. at 368.
38. Id.; Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1349-50. The eleven other subjects in-
cluded: (1) permits; (2) hours and dates of use; (3) attendance; (4) insurance; (5) vehicles; (6)
concession of goods; (7) revenue; (8) safety; (9) portable toilets; (10) cleanup; and (11) evalua-
tion. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 368; Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
39. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1350; see also Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at
370 (describing city's purpose as to prevent offensive intrusion of noise from bandshell).
40. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 368. New York City's use guideline for sound am-
plification states:
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city-supplied sound company and sound engineer.41 Thus, the sound en-
gineer could "control what the audience hear[d],... including both the
volume and the aesthetic result."
42
B. Procedural History
1. The district courts
After RAR learned that it would have to comply with the city's new
guidelines at its annual concert in May of 1986, it sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent enforcement of the guidelines.43 RAR alleged that
the guideline's sound amplification requirements violated its First
Amendment rights,' arguing that New York did not have a substantial
interest in requiring RAR to abandon its own sound system.45
Recognizing that "live musical expression is protected by the First
SOUND AMPLIFICATION
To provide the best sound for all events Department of Parks and Recreation has
leased a sound amplification system designed for the specific demands of the Central
Park Bandshell. To insure appropriate sound quality balanced with respect for
nearby residential neighbors and the mayorally decreed quiet zone of Sheep Meadow,
all sponsors may use only the Department of Parks and Recreation sound system.
DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION IS TO BE THE SOLE AND
ONLY PROVIDER OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION, INCLUDING THOUGH
NOT LIMITED TO AMPLIFIERS, SPEAKERS, MONITORS, MICRO-
PHONES, AND PROCESSORS. Clarity of sound results from a combination of
amplification equipment and a sound technician's familiarity and proficiency with
that system. Department of Parks and Recreation will employ a professional sound
technician [who] will be fully versed in sound bounce patterns, daily air currents, and
sound skipping within the Park. The sound technician must also consider the Band-
shell's proximity to Sheep Meadow, activities at Bethesda Terrace, and the New
York City Department of Environmental Protection recommendations.
Id. at 368-69 n.1 (quoting CrY OF NEW YORK PARKS & RECREATION, USE GUIDELINES
FOR THE NAUMBERG BANDSHELL IN CENTRAL PARK (1986)). New York City contracted
with a private firm called New York Sound to provide the sound system and the sound engi-
neers needed for such musical events. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1352.
41. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 369. During an event, a sound engineer presided
over a mixing board which controlled inputs from each instrument and performer. These
inputs included the sound levels, the bass and the treble coming from each source of sound.
This sound engineer would continually manipulate various controls on the mixing board to
provide the desired sound mix and volume. Id.
42. Id.
43. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 636 F. Supp. 178, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
44. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. I. RAR also sought the injunction on the grounds that
the requirements for a processing fee, clean-up bond and liability insurance, as well as the
limited number of hours that the bandshell was to be used under the guidelines were unconsti-
tutional. Rock Against Racism, 636 F. Supp. at 179-81. The district court granted an injunc-
tion to prevent the imposition of the sound amplification and time restraints, while upholding
the guideline's processing fee, clean-up bond and liability insurance requirements. Id.
45. Rock Against Racism, 636 F. Supp. at 179. In the prior year's concert, the city had
allowed RAR to use its own sound system and sound engineers and there had been no
problems with the sound quality or decibel level. Id.
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Amendment,"" the district court granted the injunction to prevent the
city from requiring RAR to use a city-controlled and -employed sound
company. 7 The court found that the city did not have a substantial gov-
ernmental interest in making RAR use the city-appointed sound sys-
tem.4" It noted that RAR had acknowledged and followed the city's
sound regulations the previous year, and that there was no reason to as-
sume that it would not do so again. 9 As a result, RAR was allowed to
use its own sound system and engineers during its 1986 concert.50
After this concert, RAR sought a declaratory judgment to strike
down the guideline as facially invalid because it operated as a prior re-
straint on free speech.5" RAR also claimed that numerous other provi-
sions in the guidelines violated its First Amendment rights.52 The same
district court that previously had granted the preliminary injunction
prior to the 1986 concert found that the sound amplification provisions
did not violate the First Amendment.53
46. Id. (quoting Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 569 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)). The Supreme Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism
recognized that music is "one of the oldest forms of human expression," and stated that music
"is protected under the first amendment." 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989); accord Calish v. City of
Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating "musical entertainment is a form of pro-
tected speech"); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 950 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[Elven if
the music had no political message--even if it had no words-[the government] would have to
produce a strong justification for.., repressing a form of 'speech.' "); Tacynec v. City of
Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting band's performance form of expressive
entertainment protected by First Amendment).
47. Rock Against Racism, 636 F. Supp. at 179.
48. Id.
49. Id. For a discussion of the level of constitutional scrutiny to which a statute chal-
lenged under the First Amendment is subject, see infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
50. The district court stressed that First Amendment protection extends to "not only the
words and songs presented but also the sound which actually emanates from the amplification
system. That sound may be substantially affected by the amplification system itself and who
controls it. To paraphrase the old song: 'The music goes round and round, but it comes out
here."' Rock Against Racism, 636 F. Supp. at 179 (quoting a popular song circa 1935).
51. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781, 788 (1989). Facial attacks
on laws are sustained only if the law is invalid in toto and therefore incapable of any valid
application. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974). Prior restraints are acts that pre-
vent speech before it occurs, as opposed to those that punish for speech after it occurs and
violate some governmental requirement. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-57
(1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
52. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1349 n.1. The provisions complained of in-
cluded those governing the permits, hours and dates of use, attendance, insurance, vehicles and
revenues. Id. at 1349-50.
53. Id. at 1353. The district court, however, found that a number of other provisions in
the guidelines were unconstitutional, including: (1) the user fee for the sound amplification
system; (2) the provisions governing hours of use of the Bandshell; (3) the provision limiting
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In a brief opinion, the court stated that "reduction of noise, particu-
larly in a noise polluted city like New York, is a particularly compelling
government interest.",5 4 The court concluded that the regulations were
"sufficiently narrowly tailored" to meet the city's interest in regulating
noise, but stated that the city's previous effort of pulling the plug when
sound became too loud was not an appropriate alternative method of
meeting the city's objective.5 The court found it unnecessary to inquire
into whether the city could use any less intrusive, more narrowly tailored
means to accomplish its noise limiting objective. 6
The district court framed the First Amendment issue differently
than the reviewing courts that have subsequently addressed this matter.
It held that RAR did not have a First Amendment right to own the
sound amplification system used when it performed in Central Park.
57
Thus, the court concluded that "the sound amplification guidelines are
constitutional because they do not impinge upon a protected right."5"
2. The court of appeals
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's decision and held the sound amplification guidelines to be uncon-
stitutional.59 The Second Circuit found that "[t]he required use of the
city's system and technician forces each performer and sponsor to filter
its sound quality, tone, mix, and other aesthetic factors through the city's
technician and sound system,"'6 and that "[ifn the highly subjective
realm of music, legitimate regulation of noise levels does not justify
standardization."'6
The court stressed that in traditional public forums such as parks62
"the government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is
very limited."63 As a result, the Second Circuit applied a standard in
attendance; (4) the provision requiring insurance; and (5) the provision prohibiting solicitation
for funds and revenue. Id. at 1355-59.
54. Id. at 1352-53 (quoting Weil v. MeClough, 618 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
55. Id at 1353.
56. See id at 1353-54.
57. Id at 1353.
58. Id
59. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781
(1989).
60. Id.
61. Id
62. See infra notes 172-73, 180-201 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion
of traditional public forums.
63. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 369 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
177 (1983)).
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which "the method and extent of such regulation must be reasonable,
that is, it must be the least intrusive upon the freedom of expression as is
reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose of the regulation.""
The court listed a number of less intrusive alternatives that the city
could have pursued to accomplish its objective, but chose not to imple-
ment.6" For example, the city could have installed a volume limiting
device controlled by the city during concerts.66 The sponsor's sound sys-
tem could have been operated by the city's sound engineers.67 Addition-
ally, a maximum decibel level of sound68 could have been negotiated with
the event's sponsor for each event.6 9 Finally, the court concluded that
"[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest that the city cannot devise
methods to control the volume, even in the face of noncooperation, with-
out requiring the use of a designated sound system operated by the city's
technician."7
3. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals as to the sound amplification provision.7" The Court
criticized the court of appeals' stringent application of the narrowly tai-
lored requirement for governmental actions that intrude on protected
speech.72 Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-justice majority, stated
that the Second Circuit erred in "sifting through all the available or
imagined alternative means of regulating sound volume in order to deter-
mine whether the city's solution was 'the least intrusive means' of achiev-
ing the desired end."73
64. Id at 370 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
65. Id at 371.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. A decibel is "a unit for measuring the relative loudness of sounds." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 585 (1986).
69. Rock Against Racism, 848 F.2d at 371.
70. Id. at 372.
71. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989). Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia
joined. Id at 783. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment without writing a separate
opinion. Id at 803 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72. Id at 797-98.
73. Id. at 797 (quoting Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
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III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion held that restrictions on the
time, place or manner of protected speech were not invalid "'simply be-
cause there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome
on speech.' "" He relied almost exclusively on language found in Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence.75 In Clark the Supreme Court
held that "[w]e are unmoved by the Court of Appeals' view that the chal-
lenged regulation is unnecessary, and hence invalid, because there are
less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have satisfied the Govern-
ment interest."
76
The majority opinion in Ward used varying phrases to describe the
narrow tailoring standard and how it should be applied. At one point the
Court stated that "the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so
long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' ",77 In an-
other passage, the majority reasoned that "[s]o long as the means chosen
are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's
74. Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). The majority
deemed the least-restrictive-alternative analysis to be appropriate only when dealing with con-
tent-based regulations on speech. Id at 798 n.6. Justice Kennedy distinguished the Court's
opinion in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988), where the Court concluded that "the
government regulation at issue was 'not narrowly tailored; a less restrictive alternative is read-
ily available,"' on the basis that Boos involved a content-based restriction on speech. Ward,
491 U.S. at 798 n.6. Justice Kennedy further stated:
While time, place, or manner regulations must also be "narrowly tailored" in order
to survive First Amendment challenge, we have never applied strict scrutiny in this
context. As a result, the same degree of tailoring is not required of these regulations,
and least-restrictive-alternative analysis is wholly out of place.
Id
75. 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Ward, 491 U.S. at 805 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Clark, 468 U.S. at 299. In Clark the Court addressed a time, place and manner re-
striction that banned demonstrators from sleeping in National Parks in the heart of Washing-
ton, D.C. Id at 294, 298-99. These demonstrators had gathered to emphasize the plight of
the nation's homeless. Iad at 291-92. A National Parks policy prohibited sleeping, setting up
tents, storing belongings or cooking upon park premises in an effort to prevent damage to the
parks. Id at 290-91. The Park Service allowed the demonstrators to set up symbolic tent
cities in the area, but refused to let the participants sleep on the site. Id. at 292. The Court's
only analysis under the narrowly tailored standard was that "[tihere is no gainsaying that
preventing overnight sleeping [in the park] will avoid a measure of actual or threatened dam-
age to Lafayette Park and the Mall." Id at 299. The Court then concluded that "[t]he Court
of Appeals' suggestions that the Park Service minimize the possible injury by reducing the size,
duration, or frequency of demonstrations would still curtail the total allowable expression in
which demonstrators could engage." Id. The Court, however, cited no authority for the man-
ner in which it applied the narrowly tailored standard.
77. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
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interest, . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court
concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by
some less-speech-restrictive alternative."78
The majority found that New York City had two objectives in re-
quiring users of the bandshel to use its own sound system and engineer.
First, the city had an interest in limiting the sound volume at bandshell
events.7 9 Second, the city had an interest in ensuring "'that the sound
amplification was sufficient to reach all listeners within the defined con-
certground' "8 ---a problem the Court found the city had experienced in
the past when promoters, other than RAR, had used inadequate sound
engineers.81
In addressing the city's sound control interest, the Court stated that
the Second Circuit had "erred in failing to defer to the city's reasonable
determination that its interest in controlling volume would be best served
by requiring bandshell performers to utilize the city's sound techni-
cian."82 It noted that the city's interest in limiting sound volume was
served directly and effectively through the required use of the city's engi-
neer and sound system.83 The Court concluded that without this re-
quirement, the city's interest would not have been served as well,
pointing to past complaints about excessive volume at RAR's concerts.
84
The Court also remarked that the city's interest in providing ade-
quate sound to all listeners "supports the city's choice of regulatory
methods."85 Although RAR had not provided inadequate sound systems
at any of its previous concerts, other bandshell performers had.86 "[T]he
validity of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall
problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it
furthers the government's interests in an individual case."'87 Pointing to
this objective, the Court noted that the city's interest in providing ample
sound "would be served less effectively without the sound amplification
guideline than with it."'88
78. Id. at 800.
79. Id. at 792, 797.
80. Id. at 800-01 (quoting Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1352
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781
(1989)).
81. Id. at 801.
82. Id. at 800.
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id. at 801.
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Justice Kennedy rejected RAR's claim that the sound amplification
provision "sweeps far more broadly than is necessary to further the city's
legitimate concern with sound volume" by placing control of the sound
mix and volume in the hands of the city's engineer and sound system. 9
He stated that the city's requirements did not have a negative effect on
the bandshell performers' ability to achieve the quality of sound de-
sired.9" Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy pointed out that if the bandshell
requirements did have such a negative effect, then RAR's "concerns
would have considerable force." 91
The Court quoted from the district court's opinion which indicated
that the city's sound engineer allowed the sponsors of bandshell events to
control the sound mix." The Court also noted that there was no indica-
tion that the city's engineers were incapable of implementing a sponsor's
desired mix.93 From these findings, the majority deduced a two-step
conclusion.
First, the Court concluded that the city's guideline had no "material
impact on any performer's ability to exercise complete artistic control
over sound quality." 94 Second, "[s]ince the guideline allows the city to
control volume without interfering with the performer's desired sound
mix... it satisfies the requirement of narrow tailoring." 9 The majority
noted that "[tihe alternative regulatory methods hypothesized by the
court of appeals reflect nothing more than a disagreement with the city
over how much control of volume is appropriate or how that level of
control is to be achieved.",
96
Although the Supreme Court held that the guideline was a narrowly
tailored means of accomplishing the city's interest in curbing excessive
noise from and around Central Park, it warned that "this standard does
not mean that a time, place, or manner regulation may [constitutionally]
89. Id.
90. Id at 802.
91. Id at 801.
92. Id at 802 (quoting Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
Justice Kennedy stated "that pursuant to city policy, the city's sound technician 'give[s] the
sponsor autonomy with respect to the sound mix ... [and] does all that he can to accommo-
date the sponsor's desires in those regards."' Id. (quoting Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 658
F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 800.
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burden substantially more speech than is necessary. ' 97 In seeking to es-
tablish a standard that determines how much scrutiny should be applied
for the requirement of narrow tailoring, the Court stated that "[w]hile
time, place, or manner regulations must also be 'narrowly tailored' in
order to survive [a] First Amendment challenge, we have never applied
strict scrutiny in this context." 98 In concluding its analysis, the majority
held that the guideline was not substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the city's interest and thus satisfied the Court's interpretation of
the narrowly tailored means requirement.99
B. Justice Marshall's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented
from the majority opinion."° The dissent expressed two major concerns.
First, Justice Marshall stated that the narrowly tailored test required the
"least intrusive" restriction necessary to protect the governmental inter-
est. 10 1 Second, he viewed New York City's sound amplification guide-
lines to be an impermissible prior restraint on speech.1"2 Under both
rationales, the dissenters believed that the guidelines were
unconstitutional. 103
Justice Marshall supported the overall requirements articulated by
the majority for assessing the constitutionality of sound control guide-
lines. He agreed that a "time, place, and manner regulation of expression
must be content-neutral, serve a significant government interest, be nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication."" °  However, he disagreed with "the major-
ity's serious distortion of the narrow tailoring requirement."
10 5
Justice Marshall further stated that prior Supreme Court cases
"have not, as the majority asserts, 'clearly' rejected a less restrictive alter-
native test." 106 To the contrary, during the Court's 1988 term the Court
found that a statute is narrowly tailored only "if it targets and eliminates
no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." 10 7 The
97. Id. at 799.
98. Id. at 798-99 n.6 (explaining Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
99. Id. at 803.
100. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988)).
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dissent cited two other cases in which the Court had applied the nar-
rowly tailored requirement using this higher form of alternative methods
scrutiny.108 Justice Marshall asserted that the majority took prior case
language out of context when it cited cases in support of its standard.109
Justice Marshall feared the potential of future limitations on speech
if the majority's lack of scrutiny, when using the narrowly tailored re-
quirement, became followed precedent.1 ° He believed that the court of
appeals had reasoned properly in examining how much control the city
was to maintain over volume and how the city was to achieve this con-
trol.' The majority's reasoning that the courts should "defer to the
city's reasonable determination" was inappropriate. 12 Justice Marshall
concluded, "the majority thus instructs courts to refrain from examining
how much speech may be restricted ... [which leaves me] at a loss to
understand how a court can ascertain whether the government has
adopted a regulation that burdens substantially more speech than is
necessary."'
113
According to Justice Marshall's analysis of what narrowly tailored
requires, the guidelines "could not possibly survive constitutional scru-
tiny." '114 He stressed that New York City's "interest in avoiding loud
sounds cannot justify giving government total control over sound equip-
ment... [because the] goal[] can be effectively and less intrusively served
by directly punishing the evil-the persons responsible for excessive
sounds."11 Supporting his point, Justice Marshall noted that New York
108. Id. at 805 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)). In Schneider the Court invalidated a ban
limiting handbill distribution on public streets, despite the fact that it was an effective way of
minimizing litter. 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). The Court concluded that to punish those who
actually litter was a much less intrusive means to serve the statute's purpose. Id. at 162-63.
Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers the Court invalidated a ban on door-to-door distribu-
tions of handbills because directly punishing fraudulent solicitation was a less intrusive means
of serving the government's interest in preventing fraud. 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943).
109. Ward, 491 U.S. at 804-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the
cases which Justice Kennedy cited in support of his standard for narrow tailoring did not
involve traditional public forums-like Central Park-which have been traditionally dedicated
to free expression. Id. at 805 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Instead, they involved situations
where speech historically has been afforded less protection. Id. at 804-05 nn.l & 2 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see, eg., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 & n.2 (1986) (not-
ing speech includes sexually explicit materials in adult movie theater); United States v. Alber-
tini, 472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (noting speech on military base afforded less protection).
110. Ward, 491 U.S. at 806-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 807 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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City has a statute which punishes excessive noise that the city does not
enforce.' 
16
The second critical issue raised by the dissenting opinion involved
the doctrine of prior restraints.117 The dissenters believed that the "gov-
ernment's exclusive control of the means of communication enable[s]
public officials to censor speech in advance of its expression." '118 The
dissent stated that the two major requirements to uphold the validity of
prior restraints were not met in this case. 19
First, the dissent found no "'narrowly drawn, reasonable and defi-
nite standards'" in the guidelines.120 Rather, Justice Marshall found
that the goals of the guidelines were ill defined and did not place a "limi-
tation on the city's discretion." '121 Second, Justice Marshall reasoned
that, by the nature of the continuous hands-on censorship made by the
city's sound engineers at concerts through their control of the music's
sound, it would be impossible to make "'an almost immediate judicial
determination'" of whether the city's actions violated the First Amend-
ment. 122 As a result, the dissenters concluded that "the Guidelines con-
stitute a quintessential, and unconstitutional, prior restraint."
' 123
116. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 808 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Prior restraints on speech have generally been
considered by the Court as a greater threat to the First Amendment than subsequent punish-
ment. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ("[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights."); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity."); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (First Amendment
"has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or
censorship.").
118. Ward, 491 U.S. at 808 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 809 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
120. Ward, 491 U.S. at 809 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 271 (1951)).
121. Id. at 810 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 809 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963)). The Supreme Court has required that for a prior restraint to be upheld, there
must be an almost immediate judicial determination that the restricted material was unpro-
tected by the First Amendment. See Bantam, 372 U.S. at 70; see also Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975). Justice Marshall believed that each time the
city made slight variations over a performer's sound, be it either in the quality or its volume,
the government was restraining the performer's speech. Ward, 491 U.S. at 811 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Since such sound controls would necessarily be altered many times during each
performance at the bandshell, a court could not make such an immediate determination for
each action taken by the city.
123. Ward, 491 U.S. at 812 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution commands
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."124 This prohibition has been held to apply to state governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 125 Despite the phrasing of the
First Amendment as a seemingly absolute and direct ban on governmen-
tal regulations that restrict free speech, the United States Supreme Court
has not applied it in a literal fashion.126 The Court has employed instead
a number of tests to determine whether the government has violated
First Amendment commands when regulating speech.12 7 The appropri-
ate test depends upon the type of speech being regulated and the type of
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 749 n.1 (1976).
126. The Court has repeatedly stated that the history of the First Amendment indicates
that it "was not intended to protect every utterance." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483
(1957); accord Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984) (holding information
received by newspaper-petitioner solely through civil discovery process not protected); Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) (holding confessions or admissions
made by accused to law enforcement officers or third parties not protected); Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 593 (1942), vacated on other grounds, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (upholding ordinance
requiring licensing for various businesses, including book and pamphlet sellers); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1925) (upholding statute prohibiting communication advocating
overthrow of government by force); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402,
419-20 (1918) (holding utterance advocating overthrow of government by force not protected
by First Amendment); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (noting First Amend-
ment does not protect libel, blasphemies or publications injurious to public morals). Justice
Frankfurter reaffirmed this idea when he stated, "[t]he soil in which the Bill of Rights grew
was not a soil of ard pedantry. The historic antecedents of the First Amendment preclude the
notion that its purpose was to give unqualified immunity to every expression that touched on
matters within the range of political interest." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting speech not protected
by First Amendment if it advocates use of force or crime, if advocacy is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action" and is "likely to incite or produce such action"); Roth,
354 U.S. at 485 (noting obscenity, which is not protected by First Amendment, is determined
by whether average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that ma-
terial, taken as whole, appeals to prurient interest); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942) (holding no First Amendment protection for "fighting words" which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite immediate breach of peace).
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regulation at issue.1 2 ' These tests balance the First Amendment rights of
the speaker against the government's interest in regulating the speech. 129
The Supreme Court's standard of scrutiny in First Amendment
cases also depends upon the particular facts of the case before the
Court.130 However, the Court has been noticeably equivocal in deciding
cases involving free speech. As Justice Black noted, the "Court, to be
sure, has had its difficulties and sharp differences of opinion in deciding
the precise boundaries dividing what is constitutionally permissible and
impermissible in [the First Amendment] field."''
First Amendment questions concerning abridgement of speech gen-
erally require a three-part analysis. 3 2 First, the speech affected by the
challenged regulation must be identified as being either protected or un-
protected by the First Amendment.' 33 Second, the type of forum in
which the speech occurred must be determined because the degree to
which the government may limit or infringe the speech depends upon
this determination.' Third, the government's manner of and justifica-
128. These tests are all based on United States v. O'Brien, wherein Chief Justice Warren
formulated the following rule:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
129. Id. at 376-77. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Justice Brandeis elo-
quently summarized the foundational beliefs, desires and purposes which drove the people of
the United States in 1791 to adopt the First Amendment:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an ends and as a
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discus-
sion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doc-
trine, that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
130. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 65 (1976); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 19-22 (1971).
131. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 114 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
132. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799-800
(1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
133. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
134. Perry Educ Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 44-46.
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tions for restricting the speech must satisfy the standards applicable to
the particular speech and forum involved.'
A. The Nature of the Speech
In the initial step of First Amendment analysis, a court determines
whether a particular expression or activity deserves protection. 136 Using
the terms "pure speech,"' 37 "speech plus,"' 38 "symbolic speech,"' 139 and
"unprotected speech,""' the Court has delineated a sliding scale ap-
proach to First Amendment protection.' 4 1 Sometimes the Court ex-
pressly recognizes that it is applying a sliding scale approach;
142
135. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800.
136. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding statute prohibiting distri-
bution of material depicting sexual performance by children under sixteen did not violate First
Amendment as applied to bookstore proprietor who sold films of young boys masturbating);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 230 (1977) (holding public employee has First
Amendment right to freely express views, in public or private, regarding union representation);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding unconstitutional statute which pun-
ished persons who advocated violence as means of accomplishing political reform); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 394 (1969) (noting fairness doctrine and personal
attack rules, which require representative viewpoint to be aired, are consistent with purposes of
First Amendment); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967)
(holding speech designed solely to compensate victims of industrial accidents protected); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (noting false statements, made with-
out "actual malice," criticizing public official's official conduct are protected); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (noting freedom to engage in association for advancement of
ideas and beliefs is protected); Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (holding obscenity is not protected
speech); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (holding speech urging workers to join
union is protected).
137. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
(discussing high school students wearing black armbands to protest Vietnam war).
138. See Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950) (discussing labor picketing).
139. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 363 (1931) (discussing public display of
"'any flag, badge, banner, or device.., as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized
government' ").
140. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (discussing those ex-
pressions which by their "very utterance inflict injury").
141. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 967 (1987). This article discusses how the Court has employed different balancing meth-
ods to analyze various constitutional adjudication issues, including the First Amendment. Id.
at 943-45. The time, place and manner doctrine is such a balancing test. Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding restrictions on oral and written
expressions valid if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve significant government
interest and leave open alternative channels to communicate information).
142. See, eg., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985)
(Powell, J.) (recognizing that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (Stevens, J.) (suggesting that dirty words are lower
on constitutional hierarchy of protected speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (same for adult movies).
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however, the Court's typical technique is to be silent on this issue.143
The Court has afforded each of these four categories varying levels of
First Amendment protection. 1"
1. Levels of First Amendment speech
The Court has traditionally awarded "pure speech" the highest pro-
tection under the First Amendment. 145 Pure speech has been generally
defined as communicative expression in a pure state without physical ac-
tivity. 46 An example of this would be a political speech given by a can-
didate for office.14
"Speech plus" is a hybrid mixture of speech and activity. The Court
has also afforded it a high degree of First Amendment protection.148
However, this type of speech is not afforded the same degree of protec-
tion as pure speech.149 One example of "speech plus" is picketing.5 '
"Symbolic speech" includes communicative activities that involve
no verbal expression.15 1  The acts of saluting a flag,152 displaying a
flag, 153 protesting through sit-ins,154 and symbolic demonstrations1 5 5 are
143. See, eg., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 213-25 (1987) (invalidating state
law requiring voters in political party primaries to be party members); FCC v. League of Wo-
men Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (finding speech burdened "entitled to most exacting degree of
First Amendment protection," but Court looked at interests of public and broadcasters in each
case).
144. See infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
145. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969);
Susan . Rice, Note, The Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of the Judicial
Response to Municipal Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 561, 563 (1988).
146. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505, 508; Rice, supra note 145, at 563.
147. See, eg., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (speech may not be restricted
because ideas offend audience).
"148. Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. City of Rocky Mountain, 672 F.2d 376, 380-81
(4th Cir. 1982) (picketing protected by First Amendment as "hybrid... intermingling of
speech and conduct").
149. Id.
150. See id. at 379-80.
151. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (holding "the
flag salute is a form of utterance" and striking down state law requiring children in public
schools to salute flag and pledge allegiance).
152. See id. at 632-33.
153. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (holding display of communist flag
in opposition to government is means of free political expression).
154. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (holding sit-in by African-Americans
at public library is protected expression of protest against segregated educational system).
155. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (holding
sleep-in at park in Washington, D.C. to demonstrate concerns for homeless is protected
speech).
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considered to be part of this category. The Court has afforded less pro-
tection to this category than it has to "speech plus."156
"Unprotected speech" was defined by the Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.I57 The Chaplinsky holding delineated the
Court's well-established position that lewd, obscene, libelous and fighting
words warrant no constitutional protection.158 The Court reasoned that
"such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."' 1 9 Thus, how the Supreme Court characterizes the ex-
pression pursuant to the above categories strongly influences whether the
governmental infringement on the expression will be constitutional."6
2. The nature of the speech at issue in Ward v. Rock Against Racism
Although the majority opinion in Ward v. Rock Against Racism 161
did not expressly categorize RAR's music, it did recognize, as courts
have in the past, that "speech" includes musical expression for First
Amendment purposes. 62 Since music, including rock and roll songs, is
made up of sounds emanating from the spoken voice and instruments,
music should be placed on the pure speech echelon. Further, RAR's
music was political in nature163 and apparently contained no obscene or
nonvalued lyrics that would lower its value. 1"
Unlike "speech plus," which involves some physical activity other
than the creation of a sound, music is wholly comprised of sound.
Although rock concerts involve more than just sound, 165 sound was the
156. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 299; Brown, 383 U.S. at 142; Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.
157. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Rice, supra note 145, at 565-66.
158. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; Rice, supra note 145, at 565-66.
159. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. Since Chaplinsky, the Court has found other forms of
expression to be outside First Amendment protection. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
764 (1982) (child pornography); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (action that
incites violence); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity); Rice, supra note
145, at 566.
160. Rice, supra note 145, at 563 (addressing local government problem of determining
boundary that First Amendment imposes upon regulations).
161. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
162. Id. at 790; see Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1984).
163. Ward, 491 U.S. at 784 (noting RAR's political "message" was expression of anti-racist
views).
164. Id at 790.
165. Rock concerts often involve intricate light shows, dancing and theatrical-like perform-
ances. Patricia L. Brawn, Pop; Video and Theatre Shape a New Madonna, N.Y. TIMEs, June
17, 1990, § 2, at 8.
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only part of RAR's show that New York City sought to control. '6 6
Under the city's guideline, the music performed and the speeches given
in RAR's show would be forced to be filtered through the amplifiers and
engineer controls operated by a city-designated party.167 Political
speeches are classic examples of speech not involving physical action.
168
It would appear then that courts would afford the singing of political
songs and playing of political music 169 the same protection. In fact,
RAR's music and speeches had political content.
170
Moreover, music in general does not fall into the classification of
symbolic speech, because music by its very nature involves verbal expres-
sion or nonspeech. 17 1 Thus, the Court in Ward should have afforded
RAR's speech the highest possible protection. Even if RAR's concerts
are viewed as "speech plus" because of the physical nature of rock con-
certs, in light of RAR's political message RAR's concerts still should
have, at a minimum, received substantial First Amendment protection.
B. The Type of Forum
The type of forum in which the speech takes place is another factor
to consider in First Amendment analysis. 172 The Supreme Court has tra-
ditionally recognized four different types of forums: (1) traditional pub-
166. Ward, 491 U.S. at 785, 790.
167. Id at 787 & n.2.
168. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
169. Similar to public speeches, songs on musical records often contain political messages.
See, eg., N.W.A., STRAIGHT OurrA COMPTON (Ruthless Records 1989) (condemning police
discrimination and misconduct); TRACY CHAPMAN, TRACY CHAPMAN (Elecktra/Asylum
Records 1988) (expounding plight of economically underprivileged); PRINCE, CONTROVERSY
(Warner Brothers 1981) (expressing need for communication between United States of
America and former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
170. Ward, 491 U.S. at 784.
171. Although some music is incitory or equals fighting words, and thus receives little or no
First Amendment protection, this was apparently not the case with RAR's music. See id.
172. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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lie forums,17 3 (2) limited public forums,174 (3) nonpublic forums,17 and
(4) private property. 176 The classification of these forums focuses on the
character of the property at issue. 177 If the property where the speech is
made is a "traditional" or "limited" public forum, the government's abil-
ity to regulate speech is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny.1 78 Con-
versely, if it is made in a nonpublic forum or on private property, the
government's regulation is not so closely scrutinized. 179 Thus, the classi-
fication into which a court places a forum is crucial in determining the
degree of protection a court will afford the speech.
173. Traditional public forums are those government-held properties that have traditionally
been open to the public for expressive activities. Streets, sidewalks and public parks are all
examples of classic traditional public forums. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)
(striking down ban on displaying signs on streets surrounding foreign embassies because streets
are traditional public forums); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (noting side-
walks surrounding building housing Supreme Court traditional public forums); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) (noting public school mail
facilities not public forum); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)
(noting public parks and streets are traditional public forums).
174. The limited public forum is one which the government has designated for use by the
public for a particular expressive activity. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 n.7; see also Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 & n.5 (1981) (noting university meeting facility limited public
forum); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981)
(noting temporary fair grounds are limited public forums); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1976) (noting
school board meeting is limited public forum).
175. Government-held property that is neither a traditional public forum nor a limited pub-
lic forum is a nonpublic forum. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 799-800 (1985); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. For examples of nonpublic forums see Corne-
lius, 473 U.S. at 806 (holding solicitation newsletter to be nonpublic forum); United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (noting military base is nonpublic forum); Perry, 460 U.S.
at 46 (noting public school's mail facility is nonpublic forum). Because New York City per-
mitted concerts at the bandshell, and Central Park's physical layout as a park, the bandshell
was clearly not a nonpublic forum or private property. A discussion of these forums is beyond
the scope of this Article.
176. Private property has occasionally been viewed to be open to the public for First
Amendment speech. See, eg., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980)
(finding First Amendment right to access privately owned shopping center); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (rejecting First Amendment right to access privately
owned shopping center); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (finding no First
Amendment right of access to privately owned mall); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-05
(1946) (finding First Amendment right to distribute leaflets on sidewalks of company-owned
town).
177. Perry, 460 U.S. at 44.
178. See, eg., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (holding unconstitutional
statute banning specified communicative activities, such as parades, demonstrations, and pub-
lic displays of flags or banners, when applied to sidewalk in front of United States Supreme
Court).
179. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 818.
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1. Traditional and limited public forums
Traditional public forums are those properties which "by long tradi-
tion or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate."'
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization I Justice Roberts set
forth the current, well-settled principle that public parks are traditional
public forums because they are held in trust for the public and have tra-
ditionally been used for assembly, communication and public discus-
sion."82 "Traditional public forum property occupies a special position
in terms of First Amendment protection" ' so that the government faces
an especially heavy burden when infringing upon speech in this forum.
1 1
4
The government's "ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct [in
this area] is very limited" ' or "sharply circumscribed."
18 6
As Justice Roberts stated in Hague, traditional public forums exist
"[w]herever the title of streets andparks may rest." 187 From Hague un-
til the present time, the Court has consistently held that "[s]treets, parks
and sidewalks are examples of traditional public forums." 88
In recent years, the Supreme Court has continued to exemplify the
importance of the traditional public forum in varying situations. In Boos
v. Barry"8 9 the Court held unconstitutional a government statute prohib-
iting signs from being displayed on public streets and sidewalks. 9 ' The
180. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
181. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
182. Id. at 515. In his frequently quoted opinion, Justice Roberts described the parameters
and purpose of the traditional public forum classification:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citi-
zen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but rela-
tive, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience,
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regula-
tion, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
183. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
184. E.g., Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (opinion of
Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.) (noting right to use streets and parks for purpose of assembly
and communications, though not absolute, "must not in the guise of regulation be abridged or
denied").
185. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
186. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
187. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.) (emphasis added).
188. Irish Subcomm. v. Rhode Island Heritage Comm'n, 646 F. Supp. 347, 352 (D.R.I.
1986).
189. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
190. Id. at 334.
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ordinance had banned all signs critical of foreign governments from be-
ing shown on public sidewalks within five hundred feet of foreign embas-
sies.19 The Court noted that the statute "bars such speech on public
streets and sidewalks, traditional public fora that 'time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.' "192 The Court continued to
hold that such places "occupy a 'special position in terms of First
Amendment protection.' "193
Similarly, in United States v. Grace 194 the Court struck down a stat-
ute that prohibited activities on the streets and sidewalks surrounding the
United States Supreme Court building.1 95 The statute made it unlawful
for anyone "to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in
the Supreme Court Building or grounds," or "to display therein any flag,
banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any
party, organization, or movement." 196 One individual was threatened
with arrest for distributing leaflets on the sidewalk in front of the court
building. 197 Another individual was threatened with arrest for displaying
a picket sign bearing the text of the First Amendment. 98
The Court in Grace ruled that the forum involved was a traditional
public forum, 199 stating that " 'public places' historically associated with
the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and
parks, are considered, without more, to be 'public forums.' In con-
cluding its discussion on the effect of such a classification, it held that
"[i]n such places, the government's ability to permissibly restrict expres-
sive conduct is very limited."201
In contrast to traditional public forums, government can create a
limited forum. Limited public forums are those governmental properties
that the government has opened to the public for expressive activity.202
As long as these areas are open to the public, the government is subject
to the same standards as traditional public forums.20 3 This occurs even
191. Id at 315.
192. Id at 318 (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
193. Id. (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)).
194. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
195. Id at 183.
196. Id at 175.
197. Id. at 173-74.
198. Id. at 174.
199. Id at 177.
200. Id.
201. IaM
202. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
203. Id. at 46.
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though the government was not required to allow access to the property
in the first place.2°4
Thus, in both traditional public forums and limited public forums
"all parties have a constitutional right of access and the State must
demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access., 20 5 The state can-
not prohibit all types of speech in these forums. 20 6 In limited public fo-
rums, governments may draw distinctions based upon the specific
purpose for which the property is used 207 and in doing so give speakers
with similar characteristics access. 208
2. Type of forum at issue in Ward v. Rock Against Racism
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism 2 1 the Supreme Court dealt with a
traditional public forum. The bandshell was located in New York City's
Central Park, a park open for the public's general use.210 Central Park
had been "used for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions' 21 and was therefore a
classical traditional public forum.
Unlike the opinions in Boos v. Barry212 and United States v.
Grace,213 the Court in Ward made no mention of the weight given when
the forum at issue is a traditional public forum. Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion noted that "the bandshell is a public forum for perform-
ances in which the government's right to regulate expression is subject to
the protections of the First Amendment."2" 4 He did not, however, elabo-
rate on or give respect to this factor beyond this singular notation. The
bandshell's characterization as a traditional public forum should have
been an influential component in the First Amendment analysis, rather
than a cursory note buried in the opinion's text. Surprisingly, Justice
Marshall's dissenting opinion also failed to address this factor.215
204. Id. ("Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the
(limited public forum] facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply
in a traditional public forum.").
205. Id. at 55.
206. Id. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
207. Id at 55; see United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); United States Postal
Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 130 n.6 (1981).
208. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983); Perry, 460 U.S. at 55.
209. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
210. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
211. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
212. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
213. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
214. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
215. Id. at 803-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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C. The Time, Place and Manner Analysis
In a traditional public forum the state may not prohibit all expres-
sive activity.216 The state may, however, regulate speech in accordance
with one of two sets of criteria.217 First, if the state is regulating the
speech based upon its content, such regulation will be unconstitutional
unless the state shows that it "is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'2 18 This high
standard is based on the rationale that the government should not be able
to regulate the content of individual speech .21  A different test is applied,
however, if the state is not regulating the speech because of its content,
but is only attempting to regulate the time, place or manner of the
speech.
220
The Supreme Court has held that "the First Amendment does not
guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or
in any manner that may be desired.... [But instead] the activities of...
those ... protected by the First Amendment are subject to reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions. ' 221 The Court has generally held
that time, place and manner restrictions are "valid provided that they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information.
222
216. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
217. See, eg., iL at 45 ("For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end" whereas content-neutral restrictions must only be "narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication."); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981) (noting that "[t]his Court has long recognized the validity of reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations... so long as the regulation is content-neutral" but that "if a
governmental regulation is based on the content of the speech or the message, that action must
be scrutinized more carefully.").
218. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (holding
strict scrutiny standard applies to content-based restrictions).
219. See Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 132; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
220. See infra note 222.
221. Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
222. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). This stan-
dard has been reiterated by the Court in numerous opinions. See, e.g., City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177 (1983); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46; Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48; Consolidated Edison
Co., 447 U.S. at 535; Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
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Under this framework, the first step in any First Amendment analy-
sis is to determine whether the state restriction is content-based or con-
tent-neutral.223 If the restriction is found to be content-neutral, then the
court must determine whether the restriction serves a significant224 or
substantial225 governmental interest. Even if the regulation is found to
serve such an interest, the regulation must also be narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.226 Whether the narrowly tailored requirement should
be judged by relatively demanding or lax standards also must be deter-
mined.227 Finally, if the government's content-neutral regulation has
passed the hurdles of the preceding requirements, it still must leave the
speaker with one or more alternative channels of communication.228
1. Content neutrality
The primary question in determining content neutrality in time,
place and manner cases is whether the government has adopted a regula-
tion because it disagrees with the message conveyed.229 In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism23° both the majority231 and dissenting2 32 opinions con-
cluded that New York City's sound guideline was "indisputably" 233 con-
223. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 46, 115-17 (1987) (discussing distinction between content-neutral and content-
based).
224. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (stating that required governmental interest must be
"significant").
225. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (stating that required
governmental interest must be "substantial").
226. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
227. See infra notes 244-92 and accompanying text.
228. In other words, even if the content-neutral governmental restriction is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest, the speaker must have other means through
which to convey the message. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 295 (noting regulation against sleeping in
park did not prevent communication of plight of homeless in other ways, e.g., symbolic tent
city, signs, etc. allowed to remain in park overnight); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpay-
ers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (noting regulation banning posting of signs on public
property does not affect right to speak and distribute literature at same location); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (noting regulation
precluding distribution of literature and solicitation of donations among crowd at state fair
does not prevent doing so from fixed location or orally propagating views without passing out
literature or requesting donations); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (imply-
ing that regulation illegalizing burning of draft card does not preclude otherwise expressing
opposition to government).
229. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). For a discussion on the
manner in which the Court distinguishes content-neutral regulations from content-based regu-
lations, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrIUIONAL LAW § 12-3 (2d ed. 1988).
230. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
231. Id. at 791-92.
232. Id. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tent-neutral because it sought to control only the sound level of the music
at the bandshell. Because the regulations applied to all users of the band-
shell who used sound systems for musical performances, the city's justifi-
cation and purpose for the guideline was found to" 'ha[ve] nothing to do
with [the music's] content.' "234 Instead, the regulations appear to have
been adopted to regulate only the sound level for the benefit of the health
and welfare of the city and park residents. Thus, it appears that the ma-
jority was correct in rejecting RAR's assertion that the regulations were
content-based.235
2. Substantial interest
Both the majority and dissent in Ward agreed that New York City
"'ha[d] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome
noise,' ,131 in issuing its regulations. Many cases have held that the gov-
ernment may act to protect even such traditional public forums as city
streets and parks from excessive noise.2 37 New York City is one of the
most congested cities in the world, with hundreds of skyscrapers built
alongside others.2 38 Millions of people inhabit the small island of Man-
hattan2 39 requiring the noise levels to be kept at habitable levels. With
Central Park's location in the center of New York City,24° it is directly
surrounded by hundreds of residential apartments. Thus, New York
City had a strong interest in the health, benefit and pleasure of the city's
citizens by controlling any potential excessive noises that could come
from the bandshell.
2 41
The "city's interest in ensuring the sufficiency of sound amplifica-
234. d at 792 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)).
235. Justice Kennedy rejected RAR's assertion that the city's second justification for re-
quiring the use of its own sound system-to ensure the quality of the sound-was content-
based. Id at 792-93. The majority opinion noted that "[ft]he city ha[d] disclaimed in express
terms any interest in imposing its own view of appropriate sound mix on performers." Id. at
792. Along this line, the Court noted that the district court had found that the city "requires
its sound technician to defer to the wishes of event sponsors concerning sound mix." Id.
236. Id. at 796 (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at
789, 806 (1984)); see id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984) (noting gov-
ernment had substantial interest in keeping national parks in attractive and intact condition for
public to enjoy); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966) (implying that government
could keep disorderly people from participating in sit-in, considering traditional library re-
quires quiet); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (sound trucks banned from public
streets); id. at 96-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
238. See 24 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 865, 868-69 (15th ed. 1988).
239. 24 id. at 869.
240. 24 id. at 867-68.
241. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1989).
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tion" also contributed to the Court's finding that the city had a substan-
tial interest in enforcing its guidelines.242 The Court correctly noted that
"[t]he city enjoys a substantial interest in ensuring the ability of its citi-
zens to enjoy whatever benefits the city parks have to offer, from ampli-
fied music to silent meditation. 243 Thus, the city had an established
need to ensure that the sound system at the bandshell provided con-
trolled, quality sound to be enjoyed by the park's listeners.
3. Narrowly tailored
Time, place and manner restrictions must not only serve some sub-
stantial or significant interest, but they must do so in a way that is nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest.2' It is on this point that the
majority and dissenting opinions in Ward are at odds. Prior to the deci-
sion in Ward, the Supreme Court had provided inconsistent guidance in
explaining the parameters of the narrowly tailored requirement.245 This
indecisiveness is typified in the two contrasting viewpoints enunciated by
Justice Kennedy's majority and Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions in
Ward.
Although the Supreme Court has consistently demanded "'narrow
tailoring'... within the area of content-neutral regulations, it is not clear
what level of exactitude is appropriate."124  The Supreme Court uses
three primary methods of interpreting the narrowly tailored requirement.
Some cases have stated that the government regulation must be the least
restrictive of means that would enforce the government's objectives.247
Justice Marshall adopted this approach in his dissenting opinion in Ward
242. Id.
243. Id. at 797; see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296
(1984) (noting government had substantial interest in keeping national parks in attractive and
intact condition).
244. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 808, 812 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640, 647-48 (1981); SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
245. See generally SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1275-76 (discussing Court's apparent variations for
requirements of narrow tailoring); Stone, supra note 223, at 46 (discussing various levels of
review applied to content-neutral regulations).
246. SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1275.
247. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1553 (7th Cir.
1986), aff'd merr., 479 U.S. 1048 (1987); see also Association of Community Org. for Reform
Now v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818-19 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting ban on door-to-door
solicitation during business hours not least restrictive means of achieving government pur-
pose); New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232, 237-38 (2d
Cir. 1982) (noting regulation confining representatives of organizations wishing to distribute
leaflets at City Income Maintenance Centers to specific area was least restrictive method of
achieving government purpose).
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v. Rock Against Racism.24 8 Although the precise phrasing of this stan-
dard implies an absolute, non-balancing type of test, it has not normally
been applied by the courts in such a manner.249
In direct conflict with these decisions, others have applied the nar-
rowly tailored rule as requiring only that the regulation strike the precise
evil to be prevented, without looking to any spill-over effect that the leg-
islation has on untargeted activities.25 This phrasing of the narrowly
tailored test effectively delegates the narrowly tailored analysis to the leg-
islature, with little further scrutiny by the courts. Justice Kennedy fol-
lowed such an approach in the Ward majority opinion.251
The third interpretation of narrowly tailored is a middle-of-the-road
approach that appears to have been the historical approach applied by
the Supreme Court.252 This approach requires weighing any infringe-
ment on the First Amendment with the government's substantial inter-
est.253 This test does not reach a predetermined result without the need
for balancing. Instead, it requires that a judge actually assess and evalu-
ate whether the government's action is narrowly tailored to the purpose
for which it was enacted.254
248. 491 U.S. 781, 804-07 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
249. See, eg., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-27 (1989) (statute prohibit-
ing indecent telephone communications declared constitutional after balancing compelling
state interest against impingement upon First Amendment freedoms); City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984) (in analyzing whether statute is
narrowly tailored, court must weigh likelihood that statute itself will inhibit free expression);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (invalidating law requiring teacher to compile list
of all organizations affiliated with in last five years, where legitimate governmental objectives
could be achieved by less restrictive alternatives); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
148-49 (1943) (weighing civil rights interests of individual against general interest of commu-
nity in determining if statute violated First Amendment); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164
(1939) (invalidating restrictions on distribution of circulars, where valid governmental pur-
poses could be at least approximately achieved by less restrictive alternatives).
250. See, eg., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (noting regulation con-
trolling access to military base not invalid simply because there might be less burdensome
alternative).
251. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99.
252. See infra notes 333-71 and accompanying text.
253. See, eg., Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.
254. See, eg., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1784 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting failure to balance free speech interests claimed by Title X physicians against govern-
mental interest in suppressing speech is failure by Court to fulfill its duty to implement protec-
tion of First Amendment); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964) ("[E]ven though
the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved.") (quoting Shelton v. Tucks, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939) (courts must weigh circumstances and appraise substantiality of reasons ad-
vanced in support of regulating free enjoyment of rights).
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a the least restrictive means standards
On a limited number of occasions, the Supreme Court has applied a
harshly-phrased requirement that necessitates government regulation to
be the "least speech-restrictive means" to achieve its purpose.255 Justice
Marshall adopted this approach in his dissenting opinion in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism .256 The terms used in this interpretation of the
narrowly tailored requirement appear to require that the government leg-
islate in an exacting manner. However, the courts generally have not
applied this phrase in such a strict fashion.
The least restrictive means test can be criticized as being virtually
impossible to meet because of its stringent nature.25 7 That a court "can
always point out that the government has failed to take some further
issue or objection into consideration, thereby second-guessing a complex
policy decision undertaken by an elected body familiar with relevant lo-
cal circumstances" is of concern.25 8
This fear, however, has proven to be largely unfounded because
courts have not second-guessed the legislature's decision with such exact-
itude. They have scrutinized the government's regulations but have in-
sisted only that the government use narrowly tailored means, not perfect
means.
25 9
In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness26° the
255. See, eg., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980) (government can only serve legitimate interest by narrowly drawn regulations that do
not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights); Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Note, The
Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and
Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. lRv. 971, 973-1016 (1974) (discussing least restrictive means test
in varying situations); see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976)
(Stevens, J., plurality) (reasonable time, place and manner restrictions permitted where regula-
tions necessary to further significant government interests).
256. 491 U.S. 781, 804-05 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
257. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1564 (7th Cir.
1986) (Coffey, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 479 U.S. 1048 (1987); R. George Wright, The Un-
necessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech
Channels, 9 PACE L. REv. 57, 71 (1989).
258. Wright, supra note 257, at 71. For arguable examples of this judicial second-guessing,
see City of Watseka, 796 F.2d at 1555-56; Association of Community Org. for Reform Now v.
City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1983).
259. See Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 838 F.2d 735, 736-37 (4th Cir.
1988) (per curiam) (anti-apartheid shacks may be barred from university's campus without
court questioning whether aesthetic interests could equally be served by allowing them to re-
main there for temporary period); New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brenze-
noff, 677 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting government successfully met stringent "least
restrictive means" test). See also notes 244-54 for a discussion of the least restrictive means
test.
260. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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Court ruled on the constitutionality of a rule that forbade the distribu-
tion of leaflets by unlicensed persons at state fairs.26 1 A group espousing
the view of the Krishna religion did not attain the required permit.262 In
an effort to have the requirement struck down, the group filed suit assert-
ing that the rule violated their First Amendment rights.263 Because the
licensing requirement was applied evenhandedly to all persons and orga-
nizations, the regulation, as in Ward, was found to be content-neutral.2 4
The Court found that the state had a significant interest in maintaining
the orderly movement of the crowd at the fair because of the enormous
variety of goods, services and entertainment exhibited at the fair.265
In applying the narrowly tailored requirement, however, the Court
used language that indicated a "least restrictive means" requirement.
The Court stated that "we cannot agree [that the rule] ... is an unneces-
sary regulation because the State could avoid the threat to its interest...
by less restrictive means, such as penalizing disorder or disruption, limit-
ing the number of solicitors, or putting more narrowly drawn restric-
tions" on the Krishna group.266 The Court reasoned that these less
restrictive means could not accomplish what the state rule did. 267 Thus,
the Court appeared to agree that the proper standard to apply was the
least restrictive means standard. The Court, however, disagreed with the
state court's application of the standard to the facts of the case and up-
held the state statute.268
The Court reached a contrary result in Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment,2 69 where it also appeared to use a least
restrictive means analysis.270 A village ordinance prohibited door-to-
door and on-street solicitation of contributions by charitable organiza-
tions that did not use at least seventy-five percent of their receipts for
charitable purposes." The rationale behind this rule was to protect "the
public from fraud, crime and undue annoyance.
'2 72
The Court in Schaumburg held that "[t]hese interests are indeed
substantial, but they are only peripherally promoted by the 75-percent
261. Id. at 654.
262. See id at 643-45.
263. Id. at 644.
264. Id
265. Id at 650.
266. Id. at 654.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
270. Id. at 637.
271. Id. at 624.
272. Id.
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requirement and could be sufficiently served by measures less destructive
of First Amendment interests., 273 The Court reasoned that many chari-
table organizations engage in a great deal of research, advocacy and pub-
lic education that usurps their finances for salaries and other overhead.274
In addition, the village was held to have other more narrowly tailored
means to accomplish its goals. 2 75 For instance, the village could have
punished organizations that made fraudulent representations. 2 76 The vil-
lage also could have made efforts to promote public disclosure of the
finances of all charitable organizations.277 For these reasons the Court
struck down the village's ordinance.278
Other recent Supreme Court decisions also have apparently inter-
preted the narrowly tailored standard to require the least restrictive
means. In Frisby v. Schultz2 79 the Court held constitutional a city ordi-
nance that forbade the picketing of all residences.280 The primary pur-
pose of this ban was to ensure the enjoyment, privacy and tranquility
associated with homes.281 Individuals intending to picket a particular
home in the state brought suit alleging that the statute violated the First
Amendment.282
The Court in Frisby held that a "statute is narrowly tailored if it
targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks
to remedy." '283 This degree of exactness appears to be quite similar to, if
not the same as, the least restrictive means standard. The phrase "no
moie than the exact source of the evil" requires a remedy perfectly tai-
lored to the government's interest, one that could only be satisfied by the
273. Id. at 636.
274. Id.
275. The Court stressed that:
[The Village could not] lump such organizations [spending less than seventy-five per-
cent of their receipts for a charitable purpose] with those that in fact are using the
charitable label as a cloak for profit-making and refuse to employ more precise meas-
ures to separate one kind from the other. The Village may serve its legitimate inter-
ests, but it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those
interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.
Id. at 637. The Court in Schaumburg quoted from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963),
wherein the Court held that "[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are
suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone." Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637 (quot-
ing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
276. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637.
277. Id. at 638.
278. Id. at 639.
279. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
280. Id. at 488.
281. Id. at 477.
282. Id. at 476-77.
283. Id. at 485.
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regulation or statute at issue. The Court clarified its meaning when it
stated that a "complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each
activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted
evil."
2 8 4
In applying this stringent standard in Frisby, the Court discussed
how the ordinance eliminated only the negative effects of picketing on
households. 285 Nothing short of eliminating the picketing would have
eliminated the negative effects the statute was attempting to prevent.
The Court held that both the physical and psychological tensions and
pressures caused by picketing could not have been stopped in any other
manner than with its complete ban.286 The Court noted that limiting the
number of picketers would not work because "even a solitary picket can
invade residential privacy."2"' The Court concluded that "[tihe offensive
and disturbing nature of the form of the communication banned by the
[city] ordinance thus can scarcely be questioned.
'288
In applying the least restrictive means standard, the particular
speech restriction is still often upheld despite the existence of a conceiva-
bly less restrictive alternative, contrary to Justice Kennedy's implicit be-
lief in the majority opinion in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.28 9 Even the
district court in Rock Against Racism v. Ward,2 9 ° which upheld the city's
regulations, recognized the existence of this line of precedent requiring
"the absence of less restrictive alternatives" to validate governmental ac-
tions that infringe upon the First Amendment.29' Thus, there is histori-
284. Id For this proposition the Court in Frisby cited City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), a recent case where the Court upheld another content-neutral re-
striction. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485-86 (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 810 (1984)). In Taxpayersfor Vincent the Court upheld an ordinance that banned all
signs on public property because of aesthetic interests. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817.
The Court held that the complete prohibition was narrowly tailored because the "substantive
evil-visual blight-[was] not merely a possible by-product of the activity, but [was] created
by the medium of expression itself." Id. at 810.
285. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486-87.
286. Id
287. Id at 487.
288. Id
289. 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989); see, eg., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688-89
(1985).
290. 658 F. Supp. 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1988), rev'd, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
291. Id. at 1351; see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983) (noting content-based exclusion requires regulation be necessary to serve compelling
state interest narrowly drawn to achieve end); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574
(1941) (question in any particular case is whether local government control is exerted so as not
to deny or unwarrantly abridge the rights of assembly and expression of thought); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-64 (1939) ("[A]s cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon
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cal precedent for the extreme "least restrictive means" approach
advocated by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Ward.292
b. the standard applied in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence and Ward v. Rock Against Racism
The Supreme Court majority in Ward ignored the precedent requir-
ig governmental action to be the least intrusive means when determin-
ing whether it was narrowly tailored to its objective.29 3 Inexplicably, the
Court expressly stated that the "less-restrictive-alternative analysis...
has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and
manner regulation." '294
The Court's analysis of precedent extended only to Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence.295 In that case, the government for-
bade demonstrators from sleeping in a national park to protect the park's
property.296 The demonstrators wanted to sleep in two parks in Wash-
ington, D.C. to demonstrate the plight of the homeless.29 7 The Court
held that the government's regulation did not violate the First Amend-
ment, thereby reversing the court of appeals' decision.298
The Supreme Court in Clark ruled that the government had a sub-
stantial interest in protecting the parks and that its ban was narrowly
tailored to that interest.299 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had
ruled that the government did have a substantial interest, but that there
were more narrowly tailored means available to protect that interest.3c °
The court of appeals suggested that the government "minimize the possi-
the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons ad-
vanced in support of,the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights."). Although the dis-
trict court mentioned this as a requirement for validating governmental actions that infringe
on protected First Amendment speech, it ignored "the absence of less restrictive alternatives"
in its subsequent analysis. Rock Against Racism, 658 F. Supp. at 1353; see also TRIBE, supra
note 229, § 12-23, at 985 (noting less restrictive alternative analysis valid in deciding whether
regulation too constricting upon speakers).
292. Ward, 491 U.S. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 798.
294. Id. at 797 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984)
(White, J., plurality)).
295. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). See supra notes 74-99 and accompanying text for the majority's
analysis.
296. Clark, 468 U.S. at 296.
297. Id. at 295.
298. Id. at 299.
299. Id. at 296.
300. Id. at 299.
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ble injury [to the parks] by reducing the size, duration, or frequency of
demonstrations."
301
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis, gave no substantial analy-
sis for the narrowly tailored requirement, and effectively abolished the
narrowly tailored requirement for all practical purposes.30 2 The Court
did nothing more than state that the court of appeals' "suggestions repre-
sent no more than a disagreement with the [government] over how much
protection the core parks require or how an acceptable level of preserva-
tion is to be attained. ' ' 30 3 The Clark opinion did not question whether
the statute at issue was overly inclusive-whether it was not narrowly
tailored to suit its specific purpose. The opinion criticized the Second
Circuit's inquiry into whether the statute was overinclusive, indicating
that the majority of the justices do not approve of giving any specific
meaning to the narrowly tailored requirement. The Supreme Court later
applied this same shallow analysis to the narrowly tailored standard in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,3 4 as discussed above.3°0
This analysis was also applied in the criminal law context in United
States v. Albertini,306 a second opinion from which Justice Kennedy
adopted much of his interpretation of the narrowly tailored standard in
Ward.30 7 In Albertini, a case decided just five years before Ward, a fed-
eral statute had made it unlawful for a person to enter a military base
after having been barred from it by a commanding officer.30 8 After un-
lawfully gaining access to some secret military documents on a particular
base, the defendant Albertini was barred under the statute.30 9 Nine years
later, Albertini returned to the base during an open-house to engage in a
peaceful demonstration criticizing the nuclear arms race.310 Albertini
was then ejected from the military base and was prosecuted for violating
the statute.31'
The Court in Albertini held that the statute did not violate the de-
fendant's First Amendment rights.31 2 First, it noted that the military
301. I1d
302. See id.
303. Idr
304. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
305. See supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text.
306. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
307. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797; see supra notes 74, 77.
308. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 677.
309. Id at 677-78.
310. Id at 678.
311. Id at 679.
312. Id. at 690.
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base was not a public forum.3 13 Second, it held that the statute promoted
the government's interest in "assuring the security of military installa-
tions."31 4 Finally, it reasoned that the military need not allow barred
individuals onto its bases to see if they will conduct themselves properly
during open-houses.315 In conclusion, the Court adopted the laissez-faire
analysis applied in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 316 and
stated that it was not "disposed to conclude that [the First Amendment]
assigns to the judiciary the authority to manage military facilities
throughout the Nation.
'317
4. Alternative channels
The final requirement for valid time, place and manner restrictions
is that they leave open ample alternative channels of communication.318
The majority of the Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism 319 held that
the city's guideline complied with this requirement:
[T]he guideline continues to permit expressive activity in the
bandshell, and has no effect on the quantity or content of that
expression beyond regulating the extent of amplification. That
the city's limitations on volume may reduce to some degree the
potential audience for respondent's speech is of no conse-
quence, for there has been no showing that the remaining ave-
nues of communication are inadequate.320
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion did not address this issue, appar-
ently because Marshall already found the guideline in violation of the
First Amendment on the two grounds that it was not narrowly tailored
and that it was an impermissible prior restraint.321
V. THE WARD STANDARD RENDERS MINIMAL FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION IN TIME, PLACE AND MANNER CASES
The formulation of the narrowly tailored requirement applied in
313. Id. at 686.
314. Id. at 689.
315. Id.
316. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
317. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689.
318. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). "[T]he government may enforce reason-
able time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions 'are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.'" Id. at 177 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
319. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
320. Id. at 802.
321. Id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,322 United States v. Alber-
tini 323 and Ward v. Rock Against Racism 324 portends harsh results and
minimal protection of speech. It will essentially validate any governmen-
tal regulation that accomplishes what it purports to achieve even if there
are less intrusive methods to accomplish the same ends. The standard
does not examine the expansiveness of the regulation or how much regu-
lation is actually needed under the circumstances. It does not look to
how the government has chosen to regulate the time, place or manner of
the protected speech. Instead, it only examines whether the govern-
ment's substantial interest is being furthered.
This application of a standard that purportedly requires a regulation
to be narrowly tailored is outside the realm of what the actual words
themselves could mean. By definition, the word "narrow" means "lim-
ited in size or scope: restricted. 3 25 "Tailoring" is defined as "making or
adapting... to suit a particular purpose.' ' 326 Individually, these words
both have meanings that communicate a closely-fitted relationship. To-
gether, they communicate a similar theme. Thus, for the Court to apply
the narrowly tailored standard as only requiring that the regulation pro-
mote the government's interest and that the government's objective
"would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation" 327 corrupts the
normal meaning of the standard. It seems a less-than-plausible notion
that this standard was intended to be applied in this manner.
If the Court continues to weaken the narrowly tailored standard,
potentially any legislation that accomplishes its purposes will be upheld
as constitutional. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent to
Ward, "[i]t will be enough.., that the challenged regulation advances
the government's interest only in the slightest, for any differential burden
on speech that results does not enter the calculus. '328 This standard
"fails to recognize that if one has a choice between using either a sledge
hammer or a fly swatter in dispatching a group of insects, there is a sense
in which the sledge hammer, because of its relatively severe effects on the
322. 468 U.S. 208 (1986); see supra notes 295-305, 316 and accompanying text.
323. 472 U.S. 675 (1985); see supra notes 306-17 and accompanying text.
324. 491 U.S. 781 (1989); see supra notes 71-75, 77-99, 250-51 and accompanying text.
325. WERSTER's THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1503 (1986).
326. Id. at 2329.
327. Ward, 491 U.S. at 782-83 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)).
328. Id. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall illustrated the potential results
under this standard: "[A] city could claim that bans on handbill distribution or on door-to-
door solicitation are the most effective means of avoiding littering... or that a ban on loud-
speakers and radios in a public park is the most effective means of avoiding loud noise." Id.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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flooring, is not narrowly tailored for the job."'32 9 The analysis that "an
ordinance is sufficiently well tailored if it effectively promotes the govern-
ment's stated interest"330 allows the use of unnecessarily large sledge
hammers as long as they are effective. Likewise, under the Ward stan-
dard, the manner in which the city eliminated the evil of excessive noise
would be irrelevant to First Amendment review.
For example, the city could have banned all musical events at the
bandshell because (1) the city had the substantial interest in eliminating
the noise, and (2) absent this regulation there would be more noise. Simi-
larly, under the standard Justice Kennedy applied in Ward, a number of
regulations would have survived, including a total ban on the use of am-
plifiers or the playing of rock concerts that use noisy instruments.
Under the Ward standard, the Court does not hold government ac-
countable in the least. As a result, the government does not have to con-
cern itself with enacting legislation that will efficiently carry out its goals.
Instead, the Court will tolerate regulations as long as they do some good.
At the same time, the government will not have to consider the First
Amendment, even when governmental action suppresses speech.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
This section discusses the historical application of the narrowly tai-
lored requirement and addresses how Ward v. Rock Against Racism331
misconstrues the historical precedent.332
A. Historical Application of the Narrowly Tailored Requirement
The Supreme Court has applied the narrowly tailored standard in
varying manners over the years.333 Historically, the Court has applied
the test in a similar, if not identical manner to the test enunciated in the
least restrictive means standard.334 Under this historical approach, the
narrowly tailored standard appears to reflect the phrase's denotation.
The historical cases addressing First Amendment challenges to gov-
ernment regulations define narrowly tailored as requiring courts to weigh
329. Wright, supra note 257, at 72.
330. SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1052 (1989).
331. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
332. See infra notes 333-79 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 244-92 and accompanying text; infra notes 334-71 and accompanying
text.
334. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1943); see Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 161 (1939). But see Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 574 F. Supp. 1240 (1983).
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the government's substantial interest in passing the ordinance and the
regulation's intrusion on First Amendment rights.335 Under this ap-
proach, the Court does not reach a predetermined result without deter-
mining the potentially overinclusive nature of the regulation.
In Martin v. City of Struthers336 Justice Hugo Black wrote the ma-
jority opinion in an early First Amendment case337 that scrutinized the
overinclusiveness of a statute by balancing the interests of the parties
involved. The Court's ruling in Martin invalidated a city ordinance that
prohibited the distribution of handbills and any other literature by ring-
ing doorbells or otherwise summoning residents to the door.338
The Court in Martin recognized that the city had an interest in pro-
tecting its citizens, noting that "[o]rdinances of the sort now before us
may be aimed at the protection of the householders from annoyance, in-
cluding intrusion upon the hours of rest, and at the prevention of
crime. ' 339 Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to attack the overinclusive
nature of the ordinance that banned all uninvited door-to-door
communications.
The Court began by stating that "[tlhe dangers of distribution can
so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods. ' 34° First, the Court
stated that there were trespass laws that punished persons who entered
onto another's property "after having been warned by the owner to keep
off."1341 Second, the city had numerous other criminal ordinances that
dealt with the situation of swindlers posing as canvassers.342 Although
the Court did not explicitly apply the narrowly tailored requirement at
that time, it did apply an analysis that effectively balanced the govern-
335. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 143; see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (resi-
dents unable to escape interference by sound trucks without municipality's protection);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (discussing power of state to prohibit con-
duct when "clear and present danger of. . . immediate threat to public safety" appears);
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160-61 (discussing regulation prohibiting obstruction of traffic while
leafleting).
336. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
337. From the enactment of the Bill of Rights until World War I, the United States
Supreme Court did not decide many cases involving the First Amendment. For an in-depth
discussion of the First Amendment's early and formative years, see David M. Rabban, The
Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CH. L. REV. 1207 (1983) and David
M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 516 (1981).
338. Martin, 319 U.S. at 142, 149. The appellant in Martin was convicted of violating this
statute after she had gone to the homes of strangers and distributed leaflets advertising a reli-
gious meeting. Id. at 142. She appealed her conviction on the basis that the statute violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom of press and religion. Id.
339. Id. at 144.
340. Id. at 147.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 144, 148.
[Vol. 25:453
TIME, PLACE AND MANNER
mental and individual interests in a middle-of-the-road application. This
application appeared to respect not only the definitions of the words from
this phrase, but also the societal importance of the First Amendment.
The narrowly tailored requirement was again applied in the First
Amendment arena in Schneider v. State,343 where the Court ruled on the
constitutionality of four different governmental ordinances forbidding
the distribution of leaflets in the streets.3" The sole purpose behind these
ordinances was to prevent littering that resulted as a by-product of this
First Amendment protected activity.345
In striking down these ordinances, the Court examined whether
these governmental actions were narrowly tailored. The Court noted
that "[t]here are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these
is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets. 346
The Court stressed that "the public convenience in respect of cleanliness
of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which in-
vades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the
Constitution."347
Perhaps most significantly, the Court approached the issue in
Schneider with the proper judicial perspective. It noted its role in weigh-
ing such infringements on the First Amendment, declining to adopt a test
that would reach a predetermined result without the need for balancing
interests. 348 The Court stated:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the
rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the
effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as
cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of
the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free
enjoyment of the rights.349
In City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent 350 the Court applied a sim-
343. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
344. Id. at 154.
345. Id at 162.
346. Id.
347. Id at 163.
348. Id at 161.
349. Id.
350. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
January 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ilar analysis when it ruled on the constitutionality of an ordinance that
prohibited posting signs on public property.35 1 A group campaigning for
a political candidate had made a number of signs and posted them on
utility poles within the city.35 2 When these signs were removed by the
city, the group filed for an injunction against enforcement of the ordi-
nance which would allow them to post their signs. 3  The group claimed
that its First Amendment rights were being unconstitutionally infringed
upon by the city's ordinance.354 The Supreme Court disagreed with this
assertion.355
The Court in Taxpayers for Vincent first determined that the city
had a substantial interest in protecting its visual aesthetics through this
content-neutral regulation.356 Next, the Court struggled with the ques-
tion of whether the regulation was narrowly tailored to achieve this inter-
est.3 57 Distinguishing Schneider v. State,3"' the Court stated that the
posted signs were the actual evil the city's regulation hoped to stop.359 In
Schneider the Court held that ordinances which absolutely prohibit the
posting of handbills on the streets are invalid. 3 °
The Court in Taxpayers for Vincent reasoned that in a case such as
Schneider, the city could penalize those who later actually littered with
the paper given to them.361 In Taxpayers for Vincent, however, the com-
munication intended by the group posting the signs was the litter to be
prevented.362 The Court noted that "[iun Schneider, an antilittering stat-
ute could have addressed the substantive evil without prohibiting expres-
sive activity.... Here, the substantive evil-visual blight-is not merely
a possible byproduct of the activity, but is created by the medium of
expression itself. ' 36 3 Thus, the statute was held to be narrowly tai-
lored.364 The Court, however, did not reach its conclusion before it ex-
amined exactly what activity the statute was prohibiting, particularly
351. Id. at 791.
352. Id. at 792-93.
353. Id. at 793.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 804.
356. Id. at 807.
357. Id. at 808. The Court framed this issue as whether the regulation was "substantially
broader than necessary." Id
358. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
359. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810.
360. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162-63; see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
361. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808-09.
362. Id. at 810.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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whether the statute was prohibiting too much First Amendment pro-
tected activity.
365
Dicta in another recent Supreme Court case also lends support for a
middle-of-the-road approach when examining the narrowly tailored re-
quirement. In Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell366 the Court struck down a
city ordinance requiring, for identification purposes, advance written no-
tice to the local police by "[a]ny person desiring to canvass, solicit or call
from house to house ... for a recognized charitable cause ... or...
political campaign or cause." 367 Although the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it was vague, Chief Justice Burger's dicta noted how it also
was not narrowly tailored for its intended purpose.368
The Court stated that the statute was unclear as to what it meant by
a recognized charitable cause. 69 In addition, the statute required that
the person would have to give adequate "identification" to the police, but
neglected to define what was meant by "adequate."37 Hence, the Court
appeared to have recognized that the ordinance was not narrowly tai-
lored to its purpose of community safety. The Court stated that its past
cases had:
[C]onsistently recognized a municipality's power to protect its
citizens from crime and undue annoyance by regulating, solicit-
ing and canvassing. A narrowly drawn ordinance, that does
not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to determine
what messages residents will hear, may serve these important
interests without running afoul of the First Amendment.37 1
Presumedly, the Court indicated that this ordinance would not have
passed muster under the narrowly tailored component of the time, place
and manner test.
B. Ward v. Rock Against Racism Misconstrues Historical Precedent
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Marshall's dissent-
ing opinion in Ward v. Rock Against Racism 372 use the narrowly tailored
requirement in order to reach extreme results-results that are incompat-
ible with the First Amendment's marvelous protections. In the First
Amendment arena, especially when dealing with highly valued speech,
365. Id. at 808-10.
366. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
367. Id. at 611.
368. Id. at 620.
369. Id. at 621.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 616-17.
372. 491 U.S. 781 (1989); ia at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the Supreme Court should provide the high degree of scrutiny that it has
historically applied. This demands that an inquiry be made into whether
the government's actions were well-fitted for its intended purposes.
Likewise, the Court should not apply a standard that would strike
down all governmental actions that regulate the time, place or manner of
protected First Amendment speech. Lastly, for the sake of judicial clar-
ity, the Court should not state the test as requiring the least restrictive of
means when applying only a middle-of-the-road analysis.
The narrowly tailored requirement should be a limiting factor when
applied by courts. As the Supreme Court applied the standard in Martin
v. City of Struthers,373 Schneider v. State 374 and City Council v. Taxpay-
ersfor Vincent,37 narrowly tailored requires actual judicial inquiry into
whether a governmental action is accomplishing its intended purpose in
at least a somewhat efficient manner. This standard correctly requires
judges to look at a statute, look at the substantial interest that the gov-
ernment promulgates with it, and then judge whether the government is
doing so in an efficient manner. This standard does not necessarily re-
quire the government to enact the most closely tailored regulation, but
only a narrowly tailored regulation. Accordingly, the important liberty
guaranteed by the First Amendment will attain the degree of respect that
it deserves.
Courts should be required to examine what other options the gov-
ernment had in achieving its interest, as the words narrow and tailoring
denote.3 76 Judges would then have to determine under the peculiar facts
before them whether a regulation has been sufficiently narrowly tailored.
Contrary to Justice Kennedy's proclamation that the Second Circuit had
erred by sifting "through all the available... means of regulating sound
volume," '37 7 this is what courts are supposed to do and what the court of
appeals appropriately did in this case.
The Supreme Court should not require that the government find the
absolute best means to accomplish its goals. Nor should the Court allow
the government to use any means it desires to achieve its ends. Such an
analysis not only voids the meaning of narrowly tailored but simultane-
ously leaves First Amendment speech without any substantial protec-
tion.37 Although the middle-of-the-road approach is more difficult to
373. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
374. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
375. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
376. See supra notes 17-22.
377. Ward, 491 U.S. at 797.
378. It does not appear appropriate for the Court to void the narrowly tailored requirement
of meaning while still discussing it as a viable element in time, place and manner analysis. If
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apply than the seemingly absolute positions enunciated in both the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in Ward, the effort renders a considered
decision consistent with the significant protections of the First
Amendment.379
VII. CONCLUSION
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism 380 other means of suppressing the
sound levels appear to have been readily available to the city.3s1  In
weighing the heavy interest of protecting the freedom of expression in a
traditional public forum, the city should have attempted a number of
alternatives before taking over the entire sound system at the Naumberg
Acoustic Bandshell. Although it is possible that the Court may have
upheld the guideline under the more scrutinizing approach, the United
States Supreme Court should not have eviscerated the narrowly tailored
standard. The Court in Ward spared analysis at the expense of a worka-
ble and established standard, a standard that protects speech by creating
a barrier to government overreaching.
This Article does not condemn the result reached by the majority
opinion in Ward. Instead, it criticizes the road taken to arrive at its
result. Arguably, New York City's regulation could have been viewed as
narrowly tailored. By insisting that the narrowly tailored requirement
only accomplish the government's interest, the Supreme Court appears
to have given very little, if any, meaning to the narrowly tailored
requirement.
the Court continues to apply the Ward standard, it should not discuss the narrowly tailored
requirement for no reason other than judicial integrity.
379. The opinions written by Justices Kennedy and Marshall each promulgate a test for the
narrowly tailored standard that is both (1) easy to apply by a court and (2) likely to render
consistent results. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99; id. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Application
of Justice Kennedy's test will almost always rubber stamp legislation that contributes to the
attainment of government's goals. See id at 788-99. Similarly, Justice Marshall's application
will reject any legislation that is not the least intrusive means of accomplishing the govern-
ment's objective. Id. at 804. Both of these standards require little "judging" to be done by a
judge confronted with applying the narrowly tailored 'requirement.
380. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
381. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
January 1992"]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:453
